“I never ‘worry’ about action, but
only about inaction.”
Winston Churchill, Churchill By
Himself
The above-mentioned
quote is one of many like this Latin adage Facta, non verba, meaning
deeds, not words, that emphasize on the importance of actions as words are easy
and cheap without it. The myriad plethora of posts on social media by Indian
accounts, not only ignorant masses but retired military officers, is an
intellectually dishonest attempt to whitewash the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited
(HAL) for their failure of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) named Tejas. The tragic
loss of life is sad and after paying heart-failed condolences for the deceased
pilot Wg Cdr Namansh Syal who died in Tejas crash on 21 November during live
aerobatics display at Dubai airshow. However, as a pilot, it enrages me how the
Indian state machinery is trying to hide the issues with the machine and the common
people are accepting the disinformation without looking at realities of deep
systemic issues in the indigenous defence industry. The pilot may have made
some errors but in the end, it was the underpowered aircraft that failed him
and he lost his life, deserving the truth instead of current rhetoric.
I have made a video
about the reasons for crash on my YouTube channel[i] and
tweeted extensively on X (twitter) to convince many hostile Indians commenting
on my posts that the deep-rooted problems are the root cause of this crash.
However, after being unsuccessful, I decided to write this article after
reading HAL’s statement[ii] on 24
November regarding this crash being an “isolated incident” which was caused by
“exceptional circumstances” with no other details. The LCA project started in
1983 and current Indian Air Force (IAF) inventory of combat capable Tejas is, with
no deliveries expected this year, is 14 aircraft after 42 years of Aeronautical
Development Agency (ADA) and HAL’s work which speak volumes about incompetence
in this so-called success story. Last but not the least, the misinformation on
social media like this tweet by a retired Indian Army colonel[iii] is an
attempt to disguise these failures by calling Tejas a “miracle” and giving
supporting evidence as only 2 crashes in 24 years unlike hundreds of crashes of
US made F-16. For facts, we need to dive deeper for calculating accident rate
and safety record based on operational flying hours and not time spent on
ground by aircraft.
The details about the probable
cause of crash have been discussed in length already and there is a high
probability of pilot error due to partial impairment, that led to dropping of
nose well below horizon once aircraft war inverted after ‘Knife’s edge pass’
manoeuvre. Most probably, the pilot’s brain was deprived of oxygen when he
shifted from negative G i.e. forward pressure on stick to a loaded roll which
means positive G forces. This transformation may have resulted in loss of
situational awareness for precious 1-2 seconds once the blood drained from his
blood into vessels below the neck. At that altitude, losing 200-300 feet meant
that his aircraft descended sharply towards ground and though he tried to pull
away with wings level and nose high, control stick full back and centre for
ailerons neutral, the <1 thrust-to-weight ratio of Tejas failed him there.
Unlike a Spanish F-18 Hornet and Solo Turk F-16 that also got in a similar
predicament but were able to fly away due to better aircraft performance, Wg
Cdr Namansh fortunately had Tejas as his steed and it could not help him out
here. Lastly, a fly-by-wire system glitch cannot be ruled out and if pilot gave
right inputs at right time, the response of aircraft may have been the cause of
this fatal accident.
The
first flight of LCA technology demonstrator (TD) prototype was in 2001, and
Indians are claiming that Tejas has best safety record of all, better than F-16
and JF-17, as it has only seen 2 crashes in 24 years. A simple google search
for the criteria to calculate accident rate will tell any layman that flight
safety of a fleet is not based on time in years, but operational hours flown.
Generally, it is 100,000 hours per crash, but I have made a table below based
on 10,000 hours per loss. The data has been collected from open sources and
even if some figures may not be exact, it is more or less accurate in the
requirement of busting the myth of Tejas having the best safety record. Lastly,
the claim of 12,000 hours for Tejas is not right because the first 4 Final
Operational Clearance (FOC) aircraft were delivered to N0. 18 Squadron (sqn) of
IAF in 2020, with 16 aircraft by end of 2021. With 2 of those aircraft now
crashed within 5 years, only IAF can give the exact hours flown by this sqn but
many sources claim the number to be 1,954 hours.
|
Aircraft |
Introduction Year |
Operational Flying
Hours |
Losses[iv] |
Rate / 10k Hrs |
|
Rafale |
2001 (Navy) |
> 500,000 |
7 |
0.14 |
|
Eurofighter |
2003 |
> 850,000 |
12 |
~0.15 |
|
F-35
|
2015 |
> 1,000,000 |
16 |
0.16 |
|
Gripen |
1996 |
> 400,000 |
10 |
0.25 |
|
F-16 |
1978 |
> 19,500,000 |
> 650 |
0.34 |
|
JF-17
Thunder |
2010 |
~50,000 |
5 |
1 |
|
MiG-29 |
1983 |
~3,000,000 |
> 100 |
0.35 |
|
F-22 |
2005 |
> 500,000 |
7 |
0.14 |
|
LCA
Tejas |
2020 (FOC) |
~2,000 |
2 |
10 |
In
the end, I just want to express my feelings of sympathy for the slain pilot and
others flying this machine, meanwhile feeling angry about the fact that his
death has been repudiated by the country as well as the organization for which
he sacrificed his life. Even after he has paid the ultimate price for the
blunders of policy makers in top brass of politics, military and bureaucracy,
there is an ongoing campaign to hide the inadequacies of this aircraft and
shortcomings of state machinery. While it was supposed to replace MiG-21 at
least 3 decades back, the aircraft was already obsolete when the MiG was
finally retired on 26 September 2025. To keep it relevant, several systems had
to be added which resulted in a weight penalty that even a reliable engine like
GE F-404 cannot handle in extreme conditions. The Indian Navy rejected Tejas
for carrier operations due to multiple reasons, most importantly the similar
underpowered and high weight issues. Last but not the least, the Indian Navy
was forced to buy Dhruv helicopter manufactured by HAL and this article by
first Dhruv sqn flight commander[v] says it
all about poor work ethics culture of this company. RIP Wg Cdr Namansh Syal,
may you get the justice you deserve.
[1] Video
link: https://youtu.be/ohkVQaYmXyw?si=JELTdlUbgwlEYyoQ
[1] Reuters, 24 November 2025, India's Tejas jet-maker HAL calls
Dubai crash an isolated occurrence: https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indias-hindustan-aeronautics-calls-tejas-jet-crash-an-isolated-occurrence-2025-11-24/
[1] Colonel Mayank Chaubey
tweet about Tejas a miracle and its excellent safety record on 27 November
2025: https://x.com/col_chaubey/status/1993833709930467695?t=wf-WK-h8_StwipMCGfb5vg&s=08
[1]
https://aviation-safety.net/database/
[1] The Truth Hurts, Says Indian Navy’s 1st Dhruv Flight Commander: https://www.livefistdefence.com/the-truth-hurts-says-indian-navys-1st-dhruv-flight-commander/
Author
Bio
Squadron Leader Ali Hamza is a
retired PAF pilot with 20 years of experience, defence analyst, airpower
expert, gold medallist in MSc DSS (Defence & Strategic Studies) from QAU,
currently doing MPhil IR from NUML, Rawalpindi and has a keen interest in
modern airpower’s role in the geopolitics at global and regional levels.
YouTube:
https://www.youtube.com/@AeronautIR
X
(twitter): https://x.com/AliHamzaAwan1
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